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Abstract 
Nationalism remains central to politics in and among the new nation-states. 
Far from »solving« the region's national question, the most recent 
reconfiguration of political space – the replacement of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia by some twenty would-be nation-states – 
only recast it in a new form. It is this new phase and form of the national 
question that I explore in this paper. I begin by outlining a particular 
relational configuration – the triadic relational nexus between national 
minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands – that is 
central to the national question in post-Soviet Eurasia. In the second, and 
most substantial, section of the paper, I argue that each of the »elements« 
in this relational nexus – minority, nationalizing state, and homeland – 
should itself be understood in dynamic and relational terms, not as a fixed, 
given, or analytically irreducible entity but as a field of differentiated 
positions and an arena of struggles among competing »stances.« In a brief 
concluding section, I return to the relational nexus as a whole, underscoring 
the dynamically interactive quality of the triadic interplay.  
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Introduction 
For well over a century, the »national question« has been central to politics 
in the vast and variegated region occupied before the First World War by the 
three great multinational empires – Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov – 
that sprawled eastward and southward from the zone of more compact, 
consolidated, integrated states of Northern and Western Europe. With the 
breakup of the Soviet Union – heir to the Romanov Empire – and of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as well, the last of the region's avowedly 
multinational states have disappeared. Everywhere, political authority has 
been reconfigured along ostensibly national lines – a process that began 
with the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans in the nineteenth 
century but occurred chiefly in two concentrated bursts of state-creation, 
the first in the aftermath of World  
War I, the second amidst the rubble of the Soviet regime. 
Yet nationalism remains central to politics in and among the new 
nation-states. Far from »solving« the region's national question, the most 
recent reconfiguration of political space – the replacement of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia by some twenty would-be nation-
states – only recast it in a new form. It is this new phase and form of the 
national question that I explore in this paper.  
I begin by outlining a particular relational configuration – the triadic 
relational nexus between national minorities, nationalizing states, and 
external national homelands – that is central to the national question in 
post-Soviet Eurasia. In the second, and most substantial, section of the 
paper, I argue that each of the »elements« in this relational nexus – 
minority, nationalizing state, and homeland – should itself be understood in 
dynamic and relational terms, not as a fixed, given, or analytically 
irreducible entity but as a field of differentiated positions and an arena of 
struggles among competing »stances.« In a brief concluding section, I 
return to the relational nexus as a whole, underscoring the dynamically 
interactive quality of the triadic interplay.  
This very preliminary working paper, I should emphasize, does not offer 
a substantive analysis of the national question in post-Soviet Eurasia. It 
begins to develop, rather, a particular analytical perspective, best 
characterized as consistently relational, that is intended to inform long-term 
comparative and collaborative research on the subject.   
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I. 
Central to the new phase and form of the national question is a particular 
relational configuration that is unstable, indeed potentially explosive, and 
widely instantiated in post-Soviet Eurasia. This is the triangular relationship 
between national minorities, the newly nationalizing states in which they 
live, and the external national »homelands« to which they belong, or can be 
construed as belonging, by ethnocultural affinity though not, ordinarily, by 
legal citizenship. This relationship has been engendered, or given new 
urgency, by the new (or newly salient) mismatch between cultural and 
political boundaries. Tens of millions of people live outside »their own« 
national territory. Among the most important, by any reckoning, are the 
twenty five million ethnic Russians living in Soviet successor states other 
than Russia and the three million ethnic Hungarians living in states 
adjoining Hungary. The incipient long-term collaborative research project for 
which this preliminary analysis was written addresses the dynamic 
implications – in a period of massive political and economic dislocation and 
intensifying ethnonational antagonism – of the structurally ambivalent 
membership status of these two vast national minorities: the implications of 
the fact that they belong by citizenship (in most cases) to the new nation-
states in which they live, but by ethnic nationality to their respective 
external national »homelands.«
1  
The Russian and Hungarian minorities of course differ sharply in a 
number of respects. Russians have been transformed only recently, by a 
dramatic shrinkage of political space, from privileged state-bearing 
nationality, culturally and politically at home throughout the Soviet Union, 
into national minorities in the incipient successor states; Hungarians, 
similarly transformed after the First World War, have been national 
minorities for seventy years. The Russians in the diaspora are mostly 
migrants, or children or grandchildren of migrants; the Hungarian 
communities are indigenous (state borders having migrated over them, 
rather than the other way around). Yet despite these and other differences, 
Russian and Hungarian minorities must contend not only with political and 
economic reconfiguration and dislocation but also with intensifying 
nationalisms – both in the polities in which they live, and in their respective 
                         
1  Many other groups or potential groups, since in many cases their »groupness« is more a 
political project than a social fact in post-Soviet Eurasia share the same structurally 
ambivalent membership status. Among the larger and more strategically placed national 
minorities (or potential national minorities) for whom an external homeland (or potential 
external homeland) exists are the two million Albanians living in Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia; the nearly two million Serbs living (before the war) in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina; the Armenians in Azerbaijan, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh; the Uzbeks in 
Tajikistan, and the Tajiks in Uzbekistan; the Turks in Bulgaria; and the Poles in Lithuania. In 
sheer numbers, Ukrainians self-identified as such in the 1989 Soviet census in Soviet successor 
states other than Ukraine are, at more than 6 million, larger than any of the other minority 
groups except Russians. But the »groupness« suggested by this distinct statistical existence is, 
from a sociological point of view, largely illusory. Both in the Russian Federation, where over 
4 million self-identified Ukrainians lived in 1989, and in other successor states, Ukrainians 
have tended to assimilate linguistically to, and intermarry with, Russians. Although some 
political entrepreneurs have tried to mobilize Ukrainians as a national minority, they are, in 
my view, unlikely to succeed.  
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national homelands. Both groups are thus inscribed in the triangular 
relationship adumbrated above between the minority communities 
themselves, the states in which they live, and the external national 
»homelands« to which they linked by ethnofraternal ties.  
That relationship is not everywhere and always conflictual. In the case of the 
perhaps three-million strong German minority of Eastern Europe and the ex-
Soviet Union, for example, the triangular relationship has a unique and 
largely non-conflictual configuration: guaranteed immigration and citizenship 
rights in a prosperous, stable external »homeland« act as a powerful 
solvent, and magnet, on German minority communities, leading, given the 
new freedom of exit, to their rapid dissolution and depletion through 
emigration.  
In other cases, however, including those of the Russian and Hungarian 
minorities, the triangular relationship is more deeply conflictual. Here the 
new Europe, like interwar Europe, confronts a potentially explosive dynamic 
interplay between (1) a set of new states, ethnically heterogeneous yet 
conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying 
degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, 
and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation; (2) the 
substantial, self-conscious, and (in varying degrees) organized and 
politically alienated national minorities in those states, whose leaders 
demand cultural or territorial autonomy, and resist actual or perceived 
policies or processes of assimilation or discrimination; and (3) the external 
national »homelands« of the minorities, whose elites (again in varying forms 
and degrees) closely monitor the situation of their coethnics in the new 
states, vigorously protest alleged violations of their rights, and assert the 
right, even the obligation, to defend their interests. 
The research project alluded to above will explore the dynamic 
interplay between elites in these three political fields through three types of 
comparative analysis, involving comparisons across states of residence, 
between homelands, and over time. The first component of the project will 
focus on variation among Russians and among Hungarians in their response 
to the unfolding political, economic, and cultural situation in selected states 
of residence – Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania in the case of Russians; Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine 
in the case of Hungarians. For while national minorities throughout the 
region share a single repertory of responses (including migration to the 
national homeland, acculturation or even assimilation to the dominant local 
population, and – most significant for this study – nationalist 
counter-mobilization demanding cultural rights, territorial political autonomy, 
or even union with the national homeland), the particular mix of responses 
varies widely, not only between different national minorities but within each 
national minority. The response of the great Russian diaspora, for example, 
to the superimposed changes in state boundaries, political regime, 
economic system, and cultural landscape varies considerably among Soviet 
successor states, depending on such factors as (1) the size, concentration, 
and especially rootedness of the different Russian communities; (2) their 
differential geographic, ethnodemographic, and political possibilities for 
territorial autonomy; (3) the differential degree to which and manner in which 
the various successor states pursue projects of »nationalization« at the 
actual or perceived expense of Russians; (4) the differential orientation of 
the Russian state, and of Russian nationalists inside the Russian state, to 
the various communities of diaspora Russians and their respective states of  
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residence; and (5) the differential path-dependent unfolding of the triadic 
interplay between the various Russian communities, their respective states 
of residence, and the Russian Federation. 
The second component of the project will compare »homeland 
politics« in Russia and Hungary, focusing on inter- and intra-elite struggles 
to define the proper roles of Russia and Hungary as external national 
»homelands« of and for their respective national diasporas.
2 »Homeland« is 
a political, not an ethnographic category; homelands are constructed, not 
given. A state becomes an external national »homeland« for its ethnic 
diaspora when (1) political or cultural elites assert that coethnics abroad 
belong to the nation and that their interests must be monitored and 
promoted by the state and (2) when the state actually does take action in 
the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting the interests of its 
coethnics abroad. Homeland politics takes a variety of forms, ranging from 
immigration and citizenship privileges for »returning« members of the ethnic 
diaspora, through various attempts to influence other states' policies 
towards its coethnics, to irredentist claims on the territory of other states. 
This part of the project will seek to specify the cultural and political 
dynamics specific to these various forms of homeland politics, through a 
comparative examination of the Russian and Hungarian cases.  
The final component of the project will compare the overall 
configuration of the triangular interplay between national minorities, newly 
nationalizing states and external national homelands in the interwar period 
and the present. It will assess the role of imperial collapse, nation-state 
formation, regional state systems and alliance networks, great power 
rivalries, supra-national organizations, trade and investment patterns, 
economic crisis, and overall ideological climate in permitting, restraining, or 
promoting ethnonational conflict. We will seek to specify the manner in 
which political, geopolitical, economic, and ideological factors interacted to 
produce the disastrous pattern of ethnonationalism and irredentism that 
plagued Europe in the interwar period; and we will seek to specify the 
relevant similarities and differences today.
3 
                         
2  I stress, to forestall possible misunderstanding, that by »homeland« I do not mean the 
actual homeland of the minority, in the sense that they or their ancestors once lived there. 
That is not necessarily the case. Nor need the minority even think of the external state, or 
the territory of that state, as its homeland. What constitutes an external national homeland, 
for the purposes of this project, is (as I explain in greater detail in the second part of the 
paper) a certain stance adopted by elites of the external state, whether or not that stance is 
endorsed by representatives of the minority. 
3  Although there is a large and flourishing literature on nationhood and nationalism, there is 
no literature that focuses directly and systematically on the central problem with which this 
project is concerned: the dynamics of the triangular interplay between national minorities, 
newly nationalizing states, and external national homelands. Sophisticated studies of the 
national question in interwar Europe are of course alert to the significance of such triangular 
relationships (see especially Rothschild 1974, Smelser 1975, Campbell 1975, and the older but 
still valuable studies of Macartney [1934, 1937]). An emergent literature on diasporas in 
international politics (Sheffer 1986) has begun to explore the analytical issues in more general 
terms, but its focus on migrant diasporas leaves out of consideration consolidated national 
minorities (such as Hungarians) who are settled, in considerable part, in compact areas directly 
adjoining their respective national homelands. The somewhat larger but still underdeveloped 
literature on irredentism and, more generally, on the connection between politicized ethnicity 
and inter-state relations (eg. Horowitz 1985, ch. 6; 1991; Chazan 1991; Rothschild, 1981, ch.  
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II. 
Having sketched in broad strokes the project as a whole, I want now to 
complicate the picture drawn above of the triadic interplay between national 
minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands. To invoke 
in this manner a relationship between three terms might suggest that the 
terms themselves are fixed and given. But this is not the case. The three 
terms in the triadic relationship are not fixed entities but variably configured 
and continuously contested political fields. Thinking of what we summarily 
call national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national 
homelands as political fields is a useful way of making explicit that these 
are dynamic and relational concepts, and that they should not be reified or 
treated in substantialist fashion as fixed or given entities. With this caution 
in mind, consider the three concepts in turn. 
National Minority. A national minority is not something that is given by 
the facts of ethnic demography. It is a dynamic political stance – or more 
precisely a family of related yet mutually competing stances – not a static 
ethnodemographic condition. Characteristic (though by no means 
exhaustive) of this political stance, or family of stances, is (1) the public 
claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the 
numerically and/or politically dominant ethnocultural nation;
4 (2) the demand 
for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality; and (3) the 
assertion, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, of certain collective 
cultural and/or political rights. 
I deliberately sketch these characteristic claims – especially the third 
– in general and open-ended terms. For nationality-based assertions of 
collective cultural or political rights, although similar in form, vary widely in 
their specific content. They range, for example, from modest demands for 
administration or education in the minority language to maximalist claims 
for far-reaching territorial political autonomy verging on full independence. 
Other aspects of the stance of national minorities are also highly variable. 
For example, while some favor full cooperative participation in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
6) has valuably explored the determinants of state intervention, especially military 
intervention, on behalf of (or in the name of) co-ethnics in other states, but it has not devoted 
much attention to the process through which a state becomes a »homeland« for »its« external 
diaspora. Other relevant literatures on which the research will draw, and which it will seek to 
integrate, include studies of post-independence nationalism and state-sponsored programs of 
»nationalization« in new states (Smith 1986); studies of the political and specifically 
ethnopolitical dynamics of interstate migration (Zolberg 1983; Zolberg et al 1989; Weiner 
forthcoming); studies of transition and other forms of »extra-ordinary« politics, in which the 
rules of the political game and even the basic parameters of statehood are uncertain and 
contested (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Stark 1992; Laitin and Lustick 1989); the »new 
institutionalist« sociology, with its emphasis on the institutional constitution of actors and 
interests (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer 1987); and the methodological literature on 
contingency in historical explanation (Sahlins 1991; Abbott 19xx; Sewell forthcoming).  
4  This suggests why it is difficult to assert a status as national minority in states which do not 
have clear dominant ethnocultural nations (like the US). If the nation that legitimates the 
state as a whole is not clearly an ethnocultural nation but a political nation open, in principle, 
to all, then the background condition against which the claim of national minority status 
makes sense is missing. Collective self-representation as a national minority presupposes a 
certain type of collective representation of the majority.  
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institutions of the host state, including participation in coalition 
governments, others may favor a separatist, noncooperative stance. And 
while some may shun overtures to external parties, believing it important to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the state in which they live and of which they 
hold citizenship, others may actively seek patronage or protection from 
abroad – whether from a state dominated by their ethnic kin or from other 
states or international organizations. 
This variation in specific claims to collective rights, and in overall 
»stance,« occurs not only between but within national minorities. The full 
range of stances just sketched, for example, could be found among the 
Sudeten Germans of interwar Czechoslovakia (Smelser 1975). It is the latter 
variation – the spectrum of related yet distinct and even mutually 
antagonistic stances adopted by different segments of »the same« 
ethnonational group – that leads me to propose the notion of field. Using 
this notion, which Pierre Bourdieu has employed and developed in an 
impressive variety of studies,
5 we can think of a national minority not as a 
fixed entity or unitary group but rather in terms of the field of differentiated 
and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organizations, 
parties, movements, or individual »entrepreneurs« who seek to »represent« 
the minority to the state or to the outside world, to monopolize the 
legitimate representation of the group.
6  
Competition in the representation of the group may occur not only 
among those making different claims for the group qua national minority, but 
also between those making such claims on the one hand and those 
rejecting the designation »national minority,« and the family of claims 
associated with it, on the other. This is no mere academic possibility. Think 
for example of »Russians in Ukraine« (and bracket for the moment the 
difficulties inherent in the very expression »Russians in Ukraine« – the fact 
that this expression, with its clean syntax, designates something that 
doesn't in fact exist, namely a definite, clearly bounded group of Russians 
in Ukraine).
7 There are different ways of conceiving what it means to be a 
Russian in Ukraine, only some of which are consistent with conceiving 
Russians in Ukraine as a national minority. At one pole, for example, 
Russians in Ukraine are understood as persons of Russian ethnic origin, 
most of them speaking Russian as a native language, who nonetheless 
                         
5  For a particularly clear discussion of field, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 94ff. I use 
»field« in a broadly Bourdieuian sense, although I diverge from his usage in decoupling the 
notion of field from that of capital.  
6  Although Bourdieu has not written on national minorities as such, his essay on regionalism 
(1980) as well as a more general article on group-making (1985) contain suggestive 
formulations about the importance of representational struggles in the effort to make and 
remake groups.  
7  At the 1989 census, some 11.4 million residents of Ukraine identified their »nationality« 
(natsional'nost) as Russian. A larger number nearly 17 million-identified their native language 
as Russian (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Statistike 1991: 78). What is behind these numbers is 
hard to say. Clearly there are no fixed identities here, but rather a fluid field of competing 
identities and identifications. If the same questions were asked today, the results might differ 
considerably. And surely the meaning of identifying one's nationality as Russian would differ 
considerably. It was one thing to identify one's nationality as Russian when the Soviet Union 
still existed; it would be quite to do so as a citizen of a new Ukrainian nation-state. In any 
event, one should be skeptical of the illusion of bounded groupness created by the census, with 
its exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories.   
12  IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 11 
belong to the Ukrainian nation, understood as a political or territorial or civic 
nation, as the nation of and for all its citizens, regardless of language and 
ethnicity, not as the nation of and for ethnic Ukrainians. 
Were this view of Russians in Ukraine fully to prevail, there would be 
no Russian »national minority« in Ukraine. There would be persons of 
Russian ethnic origin, and persons speaking Russian as a native language, 
but they would not claim membership of the Russian nation. In fact, of 
course, there is no chance of this view monopolizing the field of competing 
identities. But since this stance does compete with an array of stances that 
do see Russians as a national minority, it too should be considered a 
constitutive part of the field of competing stances. We will continue to 
speak of »national minorities« for convenience, but it should be understood 
that this is a loose and imperfect designation for a field of competing 
stances, and that the »stakes« of the competition concern not only what 
stance to adopt as a national minority but whether the »group« in question 
should understand and represent itself as a national minority.
8 
Nationalizing state. A set of similar points can be made about the concept 
of nationalizing state, although this concept is more complex and difficult.
9 I 
choose the term »nationalizing state« rather than »nation-state« to 
emphasize that I am again talking about a dynamic political stance – or 
family of related yet competing stances – rather than a static condition.
10  
Characteristic of this stance, or set of stances, is the tendency to see 
the state as an »unrealized« nation-state, as a state destined to be, but not 
yet in fact (at least not to a sufficient degree), a nation-state, the state of 
and for a particular nation; and the concomitant disposition to remedy this 
perceived defect, to make the state what it is properly and legitimately 
destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, 
economic flourishing, and/or political hegemony of the nominally state-
bearing nation.  
                         
8  A similar field of competition between those conceiving a group as a national minority and 
those rejecting this stance (or set of stances) can be found in the case of Mexican-Americans. 
See for example the contributions to Connor, ed., Mexican-Americans in Comparative 
Perspective. 
9  One source of the greater complexity is the fact that the concept of nationalizing state is, 
as it were, »adjectival«; that is, it is a partial descriptive characterization of something – the 
state – which, even when it can be characterized as a nationalizing state, can also always be 
characterized in many other ways as well. Even when this particular aspect of its stateness is 
quite salient, the state's existence qua state is always something distinct from, and much more 
complex than, its existence qua nationalizing state. When we are justified in using the 
expression »national minority«, by contrast, the minority will have no existence qua minority 
apart from its existence qua national minority.  
10  A nationalizing state is precisely not a nation-state in the widely used sense of an 
ethnoculturally homogeneous state the very large majority of whose citizens belong to the 
same ethnocultural nation. Quite the contrary. Although it does not presuppose ethnocultural 
heterogeneity (for nationalizing projects can be, and have been, advanced even in 
ethnoculturally homogeneous settings), nationalizing states are ordinarily ethnoculturally 
heterogeneous. A further reason for preferring the term »nationalizing state« to »nation-
state« is that the latter implies an achieved or completed condition, while the former usefully 
implies that this completed condition has not been achieved. A nationalizing state is one 
conceived by its elites as a specifically unfinished state (cf. the German conception, current in 
the Bismarckian period, of the unvollendete or »incomplete« nation-state).   
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Such a stance may be an avowed and expressly articulated 
»position.« But it need not be avowed or articulated for it to be »real« in the 
sense that matters for this project, namely exercising a real effect on the 
minority and »homeland« political fields. This may be the case if policies, 
practices, symbols, events, officials, organizations, even »the state« as a 
whole are perceived as nationalizing by representatives of the national 
minority or external national »homeland,« even if this characterization is 
repudiated by persons claiming to speak for the state. To ask whether such 
policies, practices, and so on are »really« nationalizing is of course 
meaningless. For the purposes of this project, a nationalizing state (or 
nationalizing practice, policy, event, etc) is not one whose representatives, 
authors, or agents understand and articulate it as such, but rather one that 
is perceived as such in the field of the national minority or the external 
national homeland.  
This last statement raises a further complication. What does it mean 
for a state (or a particular practice, policy, event, symbol, etc) to be 
perceived as nationalizing in the political field of the national minority of that 
of the external national homeland? It is not sufficient for anyone who acts in 
those fields to perceive and characterize the state (or a practice, policy, 
etc) as nationalizing. The perception has to be »validated« or socially 
»sustained.« The perception and characterization of the host state and its 
practices and policies are themselves crucial objects of struggle within the 
political fields of the national minority and the external national homeland. 
This enables us to amend and enrich our characterization of a national 
minority. For we can now see that a national minority is a field of struggle in 
a double sense. It is (as we saw earlier) a struggle to impose and sustain a 
certain kind of stance vis-a-vis the state, namely a stance as a national 
minority; but it is at the same time a struggle to impose and sustain a 
certain vision of the host state, namely as a nationalizing or nationally 
oppressive state. It is a struggle among competing representations of the 
minority, but at the same time a struggle among competing representations 
of the state. The two struggles are inseparable. For one can impose and 
sustain a stance as a mobilized national minority, with its demands for 
recognition and for rights, only by imposing and sustaining a vision of the 
host state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. To the extent 
that this vision of the host state cannot be sustained, the rationale for 
mobilizing as a national minority will be undermined. 
But let us return to the concept of nationalizing state. I do not want to 
give the impression that the only thing that matters is the external 
perceptions of a host state's policies and practices as nationalizing. Such 
external perceptions – and the political stance they help justify and sustain 
– are indeed more important than the self-understandings of participants in 
the political field of the nationalizing state. But these external perceptions – 
in the field of the national minority or the external homeland – are not 
independent of the political idioms used by participants in the political field 
of the nationalizing state. For when nationalization is an explicit project 
rather than merely a perceived practice – when host state policies and 
practices are expressly avowed and articulated as nationalizing – the 
perception of the state as a nationalizing state will be much more likely to 
prevail in the external fields – among the national minority or in the external 
national homeland. Participants in these fields who are struggling to impose 
and sustain a vision of the host state as a nationalizing state (and thereby a 
stance as a mobilized national minority), will of course highlight and  
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constantly focus and refocus attention on the nationalizing idiom or idioms 
employed by participants in the host political field – especially when such 
idioms are employed by prominent or powerful participants. 
Nor is it unusual for participants in the host state to articulate projects 
of nationalization, to conceive and justify policies and practices in a 
nationalizing idiom. Such an idiom is not only eminently respectable but 
virtually obligatory in some contexts. This is often the case in new states, 
especially those that, for historical and institutional as well as 
ethnodemographic reasons, are closely identified with one particular 
ethnocultural nation.
11 Thanks to the legacy of Soviet nationality regime 
(Brubaker forthcoming), which endowed ethnocultural nations with »their 
own« territorial »polities,« this is the case in almost all Soviet successor 
states; for analogous reasons, it is also the case in Yugoslav and 
Czechoslovak successor states. 
                         
11  In the twentieth century, new states have been created in three great bursts after World 
War I, when the territories of the great European and Eurasian multinational empires were 
divided and reconfigured; during mid-century decolonization, when new states were carved out 
from most of the overseas territories of the Western European colonial empires; and in the 
post-Cold War present, when, in a continuation of the process of the national reconfiguration 
of political space begun in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, incipient nation-states 
have been formed from the territories of the multinational Soviet and Yugoslav states and 
binational Czechoslovakia. 
All of these states have been conceived by their dominant political and cultural elites as 
nation-states and, in a very broad sense, as nationalizing states. But there is an important 
difference between the new states that succeeded to multinational territorial states at the 
beginning and end of the twentieth century on the one hand, and most of those that were 
carved out of overseas empires especially in sub-Saharan Africa on the other. Almost every 
one of the former was conceived and justified, in the nationalist movements preceding their 
independent statehood as well as after statehood was achieved, as the state of and for a 
particular ethnonational group which, though in no case coincident with the entire state 
population, in almost all cases constituted the majority, and usually the substantial (though 
seldom the overwhelming) majority of the state population. Why this was the case would 
require a lengthy historical excursus; that it was and is the case is clear.  
By contrast, most states carved out of overseas colonials empires were not conceived in the 
same way before or after independence as the states of and for particular ethnonational groups. 
Of course, in practice, some states or portions of the state apparatus, such as the army did in 
practice come to »belong« to particular ethnonational groups (not always the same groups 
that had been favored by the colonial administrators) (Horowitz 1985). But given the general 
discrepancy in scale between colonial units and ethnic groups, the rhetoric of anticolonial 
nationalism the claims to nationhood made during anticolonial struggles were framed in a 
territorial (and expressly supra-ethnic) rather than an ethnonational idiom. And leaders of 
newly independent states also framed their nationalizing projects in territorial and civic rather 
than ethnonational terms, hoping to build up a »modern« territorial national identity (Smith 
1983).  
In fact, of course, politicized ethnicity has flourished at least as much in post-colonial sub-
Saharan Africa as elsewhere (Horowitz 1985). But in large part because of the discrepancy in 
scale between political and ethnocultural units, state-backed nationalizing projects could not be 
as easily linked to one particular ethnonational group as was the case in the new states formed 
from the continental multinational empires. 
The point of this digressive footnote is to emphasize that nationalizing idioms more precisely, 
idioms of ethnic or ethnocultural nationalization were widely employed in the new states of 
interwar Europe, and they are widely employed in the new states of post-Cold War Europe.   
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Among those adopting idioms of nationalization, there may be – and 
ordinarily is – is wide disagreement concerning domain, manner, pace, and 
degree. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish among nationalizing stances 
by the means they propose to employ. For coercive nationalizers, 
nationalization is an urgent priority. The state should use both allocative and 
authoritative or coercive resources to pursue this goal. It is the readiness to 
use the latter that is distinctive of this position. At the extreme, of course, 
stands ethnodemographic change effected through forced migration or 
murder. But well short of this extreme, a wide range of authoritative or 
coercive instruments of nationalization is available. As regards language, for 
example, radicals might favor banning the use of any but the official national 
language in all arenas of public life – on signs, in schools, in administrative 
agencies and the court system, in public assemblies, and so on; or they 
might favor imposing language requirements for citizenship, for access to 
public employment, or even for continued employment in positions already 
held in the public sector. As regards jobs – especially secure, prestigious, 
or politically sensitive public sector jobs – radicals may favor replacing 
persons belonging, or viewed as belonging, to the national minority 
regardless of their competence in the official national language. 
For »inductive« nationalizers, nationalization is important, and the 
state should actively shape the process, but it should rely mainly on 
incentives rather than coercion, on allocative rather than authoritative 
resources. State funding of educational and cultural institutions, for 
example, could be geared to the promotion of the language and culture of 
the state-bearing nation. Members of the minority nationality could be given 
incentives to learn the majority language (for example through subsidized or 
free language instruction). 
Laissez-faire nationalizers share the ideal of a nation-state with a 
common national culture but reject special measures designed to force or 
accelerate progress in this direction, believing that nationalization is most 
likely to occur if left to occur »naturally,« without coercion, preferential or 
discriminatory treatment, or »artificial« incentives. At most, the state should 
try to create a general framework under which a common culture might take 
root, and promote and encourage general integrative forces, but without 
taking specific steps to promote nationalization. 
Besides these nationalizing stances, we may briefly characterize two 
stances that reject principles and programs of nationalization in favor of 
cultural pluralism. (This is appropriate, since the field of struggle embraces 
opponents as well as (variously positioned) proponents of nationalization. 
The question around which the field is constituted concerns not only how 
but whether the state should be a nationalizing state.) Passive pluralists 
believe the state should foster cultural pluralism not by directly intervening 
in cultural matters – and certainly not by chartering or officially recognizing 
or supporting component cultural under which pluralism will flourish from the 
ground up, through the self-organization and self-expression of groups in 
civil society. Active pluralists, by contrast, believe the state should directly 
promote and sustain a pluralist society. This may official recognition and 
support of component groups, official bilingualism, corporatist or quasi-
corporatist consultative institutions, proportional representation, etc. 
The transitions between these abstractly characterized types of 
stances are, of course, fluid. Moreover, the balance of forces, or distribution 
of stances, will not correspond neatly across sub-fields. The balance of 
forces may dictate coercive (or authoritative) measures in one domain,  
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allocative measures in a second, and a neutral stance in a third. Rare is the 
state which does not use some authoritative measure to mark, at least 
symbolically, its character as a national state in some respect – even if this 
is taken for granted and therefore not perceived as such. 
External national homeland. Since the analytical points to be made are 
similar to those made about national minorities and nationalizing states, I 
will simply outline them here:  
1. Like the concept of nationalizing state, the concept of external 
national homeland denotes a dynamic political stance – or again a family of 
related yet competing stances – not a static condition, not a distinct 
»thing«.  
2. Like the »nationalizing« stances discussed in the previous section, 
»homeland« stances inflect, or seek to inflect, (or are perceived as inflecting 
or seeking to inflect) the activity of a state in a particular direction. 
3. Common to »homeland« stances is (1) the axiom of shared 
nationhood across the boundaries of state and citizenship; (2) the idea that 
the state in which this common nationality is dominant constitutes in some 
(contested) sense a (or »the«) homeland for co-nationals living in other 
states and possessing other citizenships; and (3) the idea that the state's 
obligations – and specifically its duty to afford protection – extend beyond 
the circle of those formally possessing its citizenship to include co-
nationals for whom it is a homeland.  
4. As in the case of the concepts of national minority and nationalizing 
state, these shared assumptions and orientations characteristic of the 
family of homeland stances define both a »position« – against those who 
reject the homeland stance by denying that a state's legitimate interests 
and obligations extend to protecting non-citizen co-nationals in other states 
– and a field of internal disagreement and struggle. The wider field is 
therefore constituted by struggles over whether and over how a state should 
be a homeland for its ethnic co-nationals in other states.  
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III. 
Let us return in conclusion to the triadic relational nexus between national 
minority, nationalizing state, and external national homeland. I have 
discussed the individual »elements« of this triadic relation, arguing that they 
are not really elements at all in the sense of elementary or basic terms 
incapable of further analysis. Each of the »elements,« I have argued, should 
be conceived not as a given, analytically irreducible entity but rather as a 
field of differentiated and competing positions, as an arena of struggle 
among competing stances. The triadic relation between the three 
»elements« is therefore a relation between relational fields; and relations 
between the three fields are closely intertwined with relations internal to, 
and constitutive of, the fields. The approach to the national question 
adopted here is consistently and radically relational.  
A central aspect of the triangular relational nexus is reciprocal inter-
field monitoring: actors in each field closely and continuously monitor 
relations and actions in each of the other two fields. This process of 
continuous reciprocal monitoring should not be conceived in passive terms, 
as a registering or transcription of goings-on in other fields. Rather, the 
monitoring involves selective attention, interpretation, and representation. 
The other fields are not merely observed; they are interpreted, 
characterized, represented. Often, the interpretation of other fields is 
contested; it becomes the object of representational struggles among 
actors in a given field. 
Such struggles among competing representations of an external field 
may be closely linked to struggles among competing stances within the 
given field. Thus, as we have seen, the struggle to sustain a stance as 
mobilized national minority, especially as militantly mobilized national 
minority, may be linked to a struggle to sustain a representation of the host 
state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. Conversely, a 
struggle to impose or sustain a radically or coercively nationalizing stance 
may be linked (1) to a struggle to impose a representation of the national 
minority as actually or potentially disloyal, or (2) to a struggle to impose a 
representation of the external national homeland as actually or potentially 
irredentist – a representation that might serve to justify a radically 
nationalizing stance, on the grounds that only radical nationalization could 
»eliminate« the national minority (through assimilation or exclusion or both) 
and thereby eliminate the danger of irredentism from the »homeland.« 
Perceptions and representations of an external field (and the struggles 
that seek to impose or sustain those perceptions and representations) may 
be linked with stances within a field (and with the struggles among 
competing stances) in two analytically distinct but empirically intertwined 
ways. On the one hand – as suggested in the previous paragraph – the 
perceptions and representations (and the struggles to impose or sustain 
them) may be governed by independently held stances (and by the 
struggles among them). In a strong sense, this occurs when imposing or 
sustaining a particular stance to which one is already committed, 
independently of developments in the external field, »requires« imposing or 
sustaining a certain representation of the external field, and therefore 
generates efforts to impose or sustain that representation, through highly 
selective perception or outright misrepresentation of developments in that 
external field. In a weaker but still significant and very widespread sense, it  
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occurs when a particular stance to which one is already at least 
provisionally committed, or, in other words, a particular position one already 
(provisionally) occupies in the field of competing positions, disposes one, in 
entirely »sincere« and non-cynical fashion, through well-known mechanisms 
of selective (mis-)perception and (mis-) representation, to accept a 
particular representation of an external field, a representation congruent with 
one's own (already provisionally adopted) stance or position. 
On the other hand, perceptions and representations of developments in 
an external field (and the struggles to impose or sustain them) may 
significantly reshape or realign struggles among competing stances by 
strengthening or undermining existing stances, or by evoking or provoking 
new ones. Instead of already-committed stances governing representations 
of the external field, here we have commitments to stances emerging 
interactively, in response to perceived and represented developments in the 
external field. 
Thus stances may, on the one hand, shape (and distort) perceptions 
and representations of an external field, yet they may, on the other hand, 
take shape in interactive response to perceptions and representations of 
developments in that external field. 
This dual linkage exemplifies three general features of the relational 
nexus with which we are concerned: (1) the close interdependence of 
relations within and relations between fields; (2) the responsive, interactive 
and path-dependent character of the triadic relational interplay between the 
fields; and (3) the mediated character of this responsive interplay, the fact 
that responsive, interactive stance-taking (or stance-shifting) is mediated by 
representations (and struggles to impose or sustain them) of stances in an 
external field or fields, representations that may be shaped (and distorted) 
by stances already provisionally held.  
The relational and interactive perspective adopted here makes it 
possible to give due weight to both structure and contingency in the 
analysis of the national question in post-Soviet Eurasia. The relational field 
in which the national question arises is a highly structured one. In the post-
Soviet case, for example, it was predictable – for historical and institutional 
reasons (Brubaker forthcoming) as well as for conjunctural reasons linked to 
economic and political crisis – that nationalizing stances of some kind 
would prevail among successor state elites; that successor state Russians 
would tend to represent themselves as a national minority; and that Russian 
Federation elites would engage in »homeland« politics, asserting Russia's 
right, and obligation, to protect the interests of diaspora Russians. But what 
could not be predicted – and what can not be retrospectively explained as 
structurally determined – was just what kind of nationalizing stance, what 
kind of minority self-understanding, what kind of homeland politics would 
prevail in the struggles among competing stances within these three 
relational fields, and just how the path-dependent, interactive interplay 
between the three fields would develop. Here explanation must 
acknowledge, and theorize, the crucial causal significance of the 
contingency inherent in social action, without neglecting the powerful 
structuration of the relational fields in which action and struggle occur.
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12  On contingency see Sahlins 1991, Abbott 19xx, and Sewell (forthcoming).  
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